Network Working Group W. Hardaker Internet-Draft USC/ISI Intended status: Standards Track W. Kumari Expires: 6 April 2025 Google 3 October 2024 Remove SHA-1 from active use within DNSSEC draft-ietf-dnsop-must-not-sha1-01 Abstract This document retires the use of SHA-1 within DNSSEC. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on 6 April 2025. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License. Hardaker & Kumari Expires 6 April 2025 [Page 1] Internet-Draft MUST NOT DNSSEC with SHA-1 October 2024 Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1.1. Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2. Deprecating SHA-1 algorithms in DNSSEC . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Appendix A. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Appendix B. Current algorithm usage levels . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Appendix C. Github Version of this document . . . . . . . . . . 5 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1. Introduction The security of the SHA-1 algorithm [RFC3174] has been slowly diminishing over time as various forms of attacks have weakened its cryptographic underpinning. DNSSEC [RFC4033] [RFC4034] [RFC4035] originally made extensive use of SHA-1 as a cryptographic verification algorithm in RRSIG and Delegation Signer (DS) records, for example. Since then, multiple other signing algorithms with stronger cryptographic strength are now widely available for DS records (such as SHA-256 [RFC4509], SHA-384 ([RFC6605])) and for DNSKEY and RRSIG records (such as RSASHA256 ([RFC5702]), RSASHA512 ([RFC5702]), ECDSAP256SHA256 [RFC6605], ECDSAP384SHA384 [RFC6605], ED25519 [RFC8080], and ED448 [RFC8080]). Further, support for validating SHA-1 based signatures has been removed from some systems. As a result, SHA-1 is no longer fully interoperable in the context of DNSSEC. As adequate alternatives exist, the use of SHA-1 is no longer advisable. This document thus further deprecates the use of RSASHA1 and RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 for DNS Security Algorithms. 1.1. Requirements notation The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. Hardaker & Kumari Expires 6 April 2025 [Page 2] Internet-Draft MUST NOT DNSSEC with SHA-1 October 2024 2. Deprecating SHA-1 algorithms in DNSSEC The RSASHA1 [RFC4034] and RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 [RFC5155] algorithms MUST NOT be used when creating DNSKEY and RRSIG records. Validating resolvers MUST continue to support validation using these algorithms as they are diminishing in use but still actively in use for some domains as of this publication. Validating resolvers MAY treat RRSIG records created from DNSKEY records using these algorithms as an unsupported algorithm. 3. Security Considerations This document reduces the risk that a zone cannot be validated due to lack of SHA-1 support in a validator, by guiding signers to choose a more interoperable signing algorithm. 4. Operational Considerations Zone owners currently making use of SHA-1 based algorithms should immediately switch to algorithms with stronger cryptographic strengths, such as those listed in the introduction. 5. IANA Considerations IANA is requested to set the "Use for DNSSEC Delegation" field of the "Digest Algorithms" registry [DS-IANA] for SHA-1 (1) to MUST NOT. IANA is requested to set the "Use for DNSSEC Signing" column of the DNS Security Algorithm Numbers registry [DNSKEY-IANA] to MUST NOT for the RSASHA1 (5) and RSASHA1-NSEC3-SHA1 (7) algorithms. All other columns should remain as currently specified. 6. References 6.1. Normative References [DNSKEY-IANA] IANA, "Domain Name System Security (DNSSEC) Algorithm Numbers", n.d., . [DS-IANA] IANA, "Delegation Signer (DS) Resource Record (RR) Type Digest Algorithms", n.d., . Hardaker & Kumari Expires 6 April 2025 [Page 3] Internet-Draft MUST NOT DNSSEC with SHA-1 October 2024 [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . [RFC3174] Eastlake 3rd, D. and P. Jones, "US Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA1)", RFC 3174, DOI 10.17487/RFC3174, September 2001, . [RFC4033] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", RFC 4033, DOI 10.17487/RFC4033, March 2005, . [RFC4034] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions", RFC 4034, DOI 10.17487/RFC4034, March 2005, . [RFC4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions", RFC 4035, DOI 10.17487/RFC4035, March 2005, . [RFC4509] Hardaker, W., "Use of SHA-256 in DNSSEC Delegation Signer (DS) Resource Records (RRs)", RFC 4509, DOI 10.17487/RFC4509, May 2006, . [RFC5155] Laurie, B., Sisson, G., Arends, R., and D. Blacka, "DNS Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of Existence", RFC 5155, DOI 10.17487/RFC5155, March 2008, . [RFC5702] Jansen, J., "Use of SHA-2 Algorithms with RSA in DNSKEY and RRSIG Resource Records for DNSSEC", RFC 5702, DOI 10.17487/RFC5702, October 2009, . [RFC6605] Hoffman, P. and W.C.A. Wijngaards, "Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) for DNSSEC", RFC 6605, DOI 10.17487/RFC6605, April 2012, . [RFC8080] Sury, O. and R. Edmonds, "Edwards-Curve Digital Security Algorithm (EdDSA) for DNSSEC", RFC 8080, DOI 10.17487/RFC8080, February 2017, . Hardaker & Kumari Expires 6 April 2025 [Page 4] Internet-Draft MUST NOT DNSSEC with SHA-1 October 2024 6.2. Informative References [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, . Appendix A. Acknowledgments The authors appreciate the comments and suggestions from the following IETF participants in helping produce this document: Mark Andrews, Peter Dickson, Peter Thomassen, Paul Wouters and the many members of the DNSOP working group that discussed this draft. Appendix B. Current algorithm usage levels The DNSSEC scanning project by Viktor Dukhovni and Wes Hardaker highlights the current deployment of various algorithms on the https://stats.dnssec-tools.org/ website. Appendix C. Github Version of this document While this document is under development, it can be viewed, tracked, fill here: https://github.com/hardaker/draft-hardaker-dnsop-must-not-sha1 Authors' Addresses Wes Hardaker USC/ISI Email: ietf@hardakers.net Warren Kumari Google Email: warren@kumari.net Hardaker & Kumari Expires 6 April 2025 [Page 5]